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THE PROFESSIONALISM PROBLEM
DEBORAH L. RHODE"

"[The bar] has allowed itself to lose, in large measure, the lofty
independence, the genuine learning, the fine sense of professional dignity and honor.... For the past thirty years it has
become increasingly contaminated with the spirit of commerce,
which looks primarily to the financial value.., of every undertaking."'
Lawyers belong to a profession permanently in decline. Or so
it appears from the chronic laments by critics within and outside
the bar. The American Lawyer issued its complaint in 1895, but

* Ernest F. McFarland Professor of Law, Director of the Keck Center on Legal
Ethics and the Legal Profession, Stanford University; President Elect, Association of
American Law Schools. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977 Yale University. This Article grows out
of the Keck Fellow Lecture presented at The College of William and Mary Law
School, March 21, 1997. The author is grateful for financial assistance from the
W.M. Keck Foundation, research assistance from Betsy Facher and Sarah
Killingsworth, and comments from Barbara Allen Babcock, Paul Brest, Lawrence
Friedman, Pamela Karlan, Anthony Kronman, David Luban, and William Simon.
1. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Public Service Implications of Evolving Law
Firm Size and Structure, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 19, 38-39 (Robert

A. Katzman ed., 1995) (quoting The Commercializing of the Profession, AM. LAW.,
Mar. 1895, at 84, 84).
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such sentiments are in ready supply a century earlier or later. If
ever there was a true fall from grace, then it must have occurred
quite early in the profession's history. Over two thousand years
ago, Seneca observed attorneys acting as accessories to injustice,
"smothered by their prosperity," and Plato condemned lawyers'
"small and unrighteous" souls.2
Given this historical context, it is tempting to discount the
recent chorus of complaints about the profession as variations on
familiar themes. Lawyers' ethics never have lacked for critics,
and the bar's own rhetoric repeatedly has featured wistful references to some hypothesized happier era in which law was less a
business than a calling. Although the novelty of recent critiques
should not be overstated, their significance should not be undervalued. Recent commentary consistently presents the profession
as "lost," "betrayed," in "crisis," and in "decline."3 Discontent
with legal practice is increasingly pervasive and is driven by
structural factors that are widening the distance between professional ideals and professional work.
Some of those factors are specific to the market for legal services, such as the bar's increasing size and competitiveness. Other causes reflect more general cultural trends that are reinforcing commercial priorities and eroding individuals' sense of social
obligation. Yet what is most disheartening about the profession's
current plight is the gap between the bar's and the public's perception of the problem and the failure of both groups to confront
its underlying causes.
Although lawyers and nonlawyers share some concerns, their
central preoccupations and preferred solutions are vastly different. In one respect, however, they are quite similar. Neither the
profession nor the public has addressed its own ambivalence

2. 2 PLATO, THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 175 (B. Jowett trans., Random House

1937); Online Exchange, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at S39.
3. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993); SOL M. LINOwITz WITH
MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION (1994); Russell G. Pearce, The Profes.
sionalism Pardigm Shift: Why Discarding Professsional Ideology Will Improve the
Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1257 (1995); Robert L.
Haig, Lawyer-Bashing: Have We Earned It?, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1993, at 2, 2; Identity Crisis, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1994, at 74, 74; see also Chris Klein, Big-Firm Partners:
Profession Sinking, NATL L.J., May 26, 1997, at Al (reporting that over 80% of
surveyed partners at large firms believe the profession has changed for the worse).
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over competing values. Nor has either group been willing to
make the tradeoffs and invest the resources that effective reform
strategies require. The result has been symbolic crusades and
political paralysis on problems far too important to be left
unremedied.
I.

THE PROBLEM FROM THE PUBLIC'S PERSPECTIVE

What the public doesn't like about lawyers could fill volumes.
Although the order of grievances changes somewhat over time,
certain consistent themes emerge. Recent survey data, together
with the critiques and caricatures that most often surface in
popular culture, raise two primary concerns. The first involves
character defects associated with lawyers. The second involves
problems in the advocate's role and the adversary system for
which lawyers are held partly responsible.
Of all the traits that the public dislikes in attorneys, greed is
at the top of the pecking order. "A lawyer is a learned gentleman
who rescues your estate from your enemies and keeps it himself. It is an old quip, but the perception remains widely
shared. According to national surveys, including one by the
American Bar Association (ABA), about three-fifths of Americans
described attorneys as greedy, and over one-half thought they
charged excessive fees.5 Other polls find even broader agreement
that lawyers handle many matters that could be resolved as
effectively and less expensively by nonlawyers.6
The public's other principal complaint about attorneys' character involves integrity. Only one-fifth of the ABA survey participants felt that the phrase "honest and ethical" described law-

4. Henry Broughman (1778-1868), quoted in THE WIT OF WESTMINSTER 33 (Adam
Sykes & Iain Sproat eds., 1967).
5. See Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA
Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 63; see also Robin Pogrebin, The Observer Poll:
Lawyers Overpaid, Not So Honest, N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 18, 1991, at 1 (finding that
59% of surveyed New Yorkers believe lawyers are oveipaid); Randall Samborn, AntiLawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1, 22 (finding that 31% of a na-.
tional sample believe lawyers are too interested in money).
6. See, e.g., BARBARA A. CURRAN, AMERICAN BAR ASSN & AMERICAN BAR FOUND.,
THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 244
(1977).
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yers.7 In other recent studies, close to one-third of Americans
believed that lawyers were less honest than most people, and
only about a quarter believed lawyers were very honest or mostly honest.8 These ratings put lawyers substantially below members of other occupations, such as doctors, police officers, and
educators.' Most groups that consistently rank worse than attorneys are not attractive bedfellows: politicians and sellers of real
estate, insurance, and used cars.'0 Concerns about integrity are
equally apparent in antilawyer humor, which features countless
variations on the same theme: "How do you know when a lawyer
is lying? When his lips are moving.""

Underlying such quips are more serious subtexts. Humor
serves as a socially acceptable way of expressing hostility; the
increasing frequency and virulence of antilawyer jokes is some
testament to public disaffection. Contemporary American attorneys are especially frequent targets of popular abuse, partly because they seem so impervious to other forms of criticism. Common complaints include arrogance, incivility, and insensitivity or
inattention to client concerns. Less than one-fifth of Americans in
the ABA study felt that the terms "caring and compassionate" described lawyers. 2 Unsurprisingly, reports of callous or condescending treatment are especially common among disempowered
groups, such as women in divorce cases or indigent defendants."3 Perceptions of arrogance, however, are also frequent
7. See Hengstler, supra note 5, at 62.
8. See Samborn, supra note 5, at 20; Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers
Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995, at 50, 52.
9. See Leslie McAneny & David W. Moore, Annual Honesty and Ethics Poll: Congress and Media Sink in Public Esteem, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Oct. 1994, at 2, 2;
see also David S. Casey Jr., What Has Become of Lawyers?, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 23,
1997, at 4 (reporting Mervin Field poll in which the public ranked lawyers second to

last among professions that inspired confidence).
10. See William E. Hornsby, Jr. & Kurt Schimmel, Regulating Lawyer Advertising:
Public Images and the IrresistibleAristotelian Impulse, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 325,
325 n.2 (1996) (collecting surveys); Samborn, supra note 5, at 20; Budiansky et al.,

supra note 8, at 52.
11. See, e.g., STAN ROSS, THE JOHE's ON... LAWYERS (1996); Kenneth Lasson,
Lawyering Askew: Excesses in the Pursuit of Fees and Justice, 74 B.U. L. REV. 723,
725 n.7 (1994).
12. Hengstler, supra note 5, at 62.
13. See, e.g., KAREN WINNER, DIVORCED FROM JUSTICE 3-14, 26-54 (1996); W.L.F.
Felstiner, Professional Inattention: Origins and Consequences, in THE HUMAN FACE
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even among the most influential consumers of legal services,
including in-house counsel who hire outside law firms.'4 Insensitivity and neglect are among the main sources of complaints to
bar disciplinary authorities. 5 Given these perceptions, it should
come as no surprise that ninety to ninety-five percent of surveyed
parents would not want their children to become lawyers. 6
Part of what the public dislikes about the legal profession is

hard to disentangle from what it dislikes about the law, the legal
system, and the lawyer's role within that system. Because the
bar exercises so much power over all of these matters, it is also
held accountable for systemic failures.
One cluster of complaints focuses on attorneys' amoral advocacy-the willingness to defend causes and clients without regard
to their ethical merits. Many individuals share Lord Macaulay's
complaint that a lawyer will "do for [money] what.., he would

think it wicked and infamous to do for an empire." 7 Two-thirds
of surveyed Americans believe that attorneys are no longer "seeker[s] of justice," and one-fourth believe that they inappropriately

"manipulate the legal system without regard for right or
wrong." 8 Some individuals are particularly critical of defense
counsels' role in freeing the guilty. Others fault lawyers for
representing wealthy corporations at the expense of the public.2 °

OF LAW 128 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1997); Carl J. Hosticka, We Don't Care About What
Happened, We Only Care About What is Going to Happen: Lawyer-Client Negotiations
of Reality, 26 Soc. PROBS. 599 (1979); see also Roy B. Fleming, Client Games: Defense Attorney Perspectives on Their Relations With Criminal Clients, 1986 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 253, 254 (discussing indigent criminal defendants' misgivings about
court-appointed attorneys).
14. See, e.g., Paul M. Barret, New York Firms Called Pricey, Arrogant, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 11, 1996, at B8.
15. Over 80% of the complaints filed with bar disciplinary agencies involve "client
relations" rather than a breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct. See Janet
Stidman Eveleth, Perception is Reality, MD. B.J., July-Aug. 1994, at 7, 8; see also
When You Need a Lawyer, CONSUMER REP., Feb. 1996, at 34 (reporting that one-fifth
of surveyed clients claimed their lawyer did not return phone calls promptly or paid
too little attention to the case).
16. See Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfactionwith the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 87 (1994); Samborn, supra note 5, at 20.
17. 6 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 163 (Lady Trevelyan ed., 1900).
18. Hengstler, supra note 5, at 62; Samborn, supra note 5, at 22.
19. See Samborn, supra note 5, at 20.
20. See id. at 22.
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Attorneys also are blamed for perpetuating and profiting from
an unnecessarily cumbersome system. Most Americans believe
that the nation has too much law and too little justice.21 Over
the last half century, legal regulation has become an increasing
presence throughout personal and public life, and it is not always a welcome guest. Everyone hears tales of disputes that are
too big for courts, disputes that are too small, and disputes that
should never have been disputes at all. At one end of the spectrum are the legal stegosauri that can amble on for decades,
leaving in their paths endless paper trails and exorbitant legal
bills.22 At the other extreme are the trivial pursuits: football fans
suing referees, suitors suing dates, or beauty contestants suing
each other." About one-half of surveyed individuals blame lawyers for filing too many lawsuits,' and almost three-quarters believe that the United States has too many lawyers.' The most
meanspirited antilawyer humor endlessly replays these themes:
"Why does New Jersey have so many toxic waste dumps and
California have so many lawyers? New Jersey got first
choice." 6
From the public's vantage, problems in the legal system frequently are of the profession's own making. Members of the bar,
working as lobbyists, legislators, and judges, have created a
structure that seems far too complex, expensive, and open to
abuse. As newspaper columnist Art Buchwald once observed, "it
isn't the bad lawyers who are screwing up the justice system in

21. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: An Argument
for Delegalizing America, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25.
22. See, e.g., JETHRO K. LIEBERMANN, CRISIS AT THE BAR 164-65 (1978) (reporting
Bruce Bromley's discussion of a fourteen-year antitrust case involving a 50,000 page
record but no real dispute about the facts); Jack W. Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants: Can Emerging Medical, Legal, and Scientific Concepts Be Reconciled?, 18 J.
LEGAL MED. 133, 212 (1997) (discussing toxic tort cases).
23. See Cherna v. Cherna, 427 So. 2d 395, 396 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (discussing Redskins and suitor cases); Bridges v. Georgiana, 511 A.2d 1255 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1985) (adjudicating beauty contestant's claim); MARY ANN GLENDON, A
NATION UNDER LAWYERS 257-58 (1994) (discussing suitor case).
24. See Hengstler, supra note 5, at 63.
25. See Tony Mauro, Lawyers' Top Topic: Public's Perception, USA TODAY, Aug. 10,
1993, at 3a, available in 1993 WL 6716078.
26. See ROSS, supra note 11, at 64-94; Lasson, supra note 11, at 723-25;
Budiansky et al., supra note 8, at 50.
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this country-it's the good lawyers.... If you have two competent lawyers on opposite sides, a trial that should take three
days could easily last six months."27 Because legal services are
allocated almost entirely through market mechanisms, many
Americans seem to end up with all-and only-the justice that
money can buy. The result is much as a New Yorker cartoon
portrays it, in which a well-heeled lawyer informs his client,
"You have a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much justice can
you afford?"

II. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROBLEM AS THE PUBLIC SEES IT
For many lawyers, these public perceptions have been a source
of longstanding frustration. When asked to identify the most
important problems facing the profession, lawyers consistently
have put public image and credibility at the top of the list.29 Yet
when confronted with specific complaints, bar leaders typically
respond with irritation or resignation. From their vantage, popular perceptions seem unfair and uninformed. 0 Although the bar's
conventional reaction is not without some basis, neither is the
public's list of grievances. Lawyers have good insights about
what is wrong with everyone else's view of lawyering, but they
appear far less sensitive to what is often right. On the infrequent
occasions that the organized bar seriously has considered popular complaints, the results rarely have been impressive. Attention has focused more on refurbishing lawyers' tarnished image
than on addressing the problems that create it. 3
The profession's most common response to popular criticism is
to deny its validity. Over half of some 2800 surveyed lawyers,
judges, and law students believe that the public's negative perception of the profession is "due to its ignorance ... and is fundamentally unjustified." 2 As one recent ABA president put it,
27. FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, AMERICAN BAR FoUND., THE
MAKING OF A PUBLC PROFESSION 3 (1981) (quoting humorist Art Buchwald).
28. THE NEW YORKER BOOK OF LAWYER CARTOONS 73 (1994).

29. See Law Poll: Lawyers Concerned About Their Image and Credibility, 69
A.B.A. J. 440, 440 (1983); see also infra text accompanying notes 45-47 (discussing
the ABA's and California Trial Lawyers Association's public relations campaigns).
30. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.

31. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
32. Wes Hanson, Reflections on Lawyers: New Polls Hold a Mirror to the Profes-
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"[tihe3 average American doesn't understand what all the issues
3
are."
Blame for this sorry state is distributed widely, but the media
receives a generous share. According to bar leaders, portraits of
vicious and venal lawyering are a Hollywood staple, and journalistic coverage is similarly skewed. The press reportedly enjoy
featuring lawyers' sensational and egregious conduct. The fraud
and felonies of a few "bad apples" get front page coverage, while
lawyers' "countless other acts of quiet heroism.., go unnoticed
and unpublicized." 4
The problem, as bar leaders see it, is compounded by lawyers
who are "their own worst salesmen... [who] do not do a good
job blowing their own trumpet about their selfless activities." 3
Many practitioners provide a "tremendous" amount of pro bono
assistance or work "incredible hours" for reduced fees: at times,
a lawyer's hourly rate "works out to less than the minimum
wage."36 A constant refrain among the bar is that "no other profession.., is as charitable with its time and money."" No evidence is cited.
Nor are such responses likely to convince the audiences most in
need of convincing. Many portrayals by bar leaders are no less
exaggerated than the media coverage they denounce. If, for example, long hours, low pay, and charitable contributions are the
standards for comparison, then the legal profession is unlikely to
win a selflessness sweepstakes. Ministers, social workers, and

sion, ETHIcs: EASIER SAID THAN DONE, 1993 (23/24), at 34, 35.
33. Hank Grezlak, New ABA President Seeks Overhaul of Justice System, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 13, 1993, at 1, 8 (quoting ABA President R. William Ide III);
see also David M. Balabanian, Our Unpopular Profession, CAL. LAW., Apr., 1997, at
96, 96 (noting that "[t]here will always be people-at times even a majority-who do
not want justice, safety, or freedom for others").
34. Haig, supra note 3, at 2.
35. Bill Rankin, Nation's Lawyers Seeking to Polish Tarnished Image, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Aug. 9, 1993, at 4, available in 1993 WL 3378489 (quoting criminal defense attorney Ed Garland); see Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 25, 1997, at A6 (quoting Chicago partner Lawrence Gerber's assertion that
"Lawyers and law firms do a tremendous amount of good," such as providing pro
bono assistance, and "we're just not public about it").
36. Haig, supra note 3, at 2; Klein, supra note 35, at A6 (quoting Lawrence

Gerber).
37. Haig, supra note 3, at 2.
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other professions have a better shot. Although most attorneys'
incomes may not measure up to popular culture's glamorized
perception, few practitioners frequently toil for minimum wages.
Law has become America's highest paid profession.3 8
It is also unclear that the public's perceptions would shift if
information about the bar's charitable works were trumpeted
from more rooftops. As a percentage of income, lawyers' pro bono
contributions are quite modest. In New York, where bar leaders
perceive "countless" acts of "quiet heroism," 9 about half of
practicing lawyers provide no pro bono assistance to the poor.4"
The average for the other half is about forty-four hours per
year.4 1 Although national data are limited, New York lawyers do
not appear exceptional. In Florida, which is the only state that
requires members of the bar to report pro bono assistance, the
average contribution is under fourteen hours per year.42 According to the best estimates available, the profession as a whole
provides less than half an hour per week of assistance to the
poor.4 3
It is also doubtful that lawyers' excessive modesty is at the
root of their public image problems. The legal profession is not
known for its reticence in self-promotion. Lawyers spend well
over $500 million annually in advertising their own services,
and various bar organizations devote healthy budgets to public
relations campaigns.' In the mid-1990s, the ABA developed a
38. See Margaret Cronin Fisk, Overall, Lawyers' Pay Tops Other Professions',
NAT'L L.J., July 10, 1995, at C2.
39. Haig, supra note 3, at 2.
40. See Gary Spencer, Lawyers' Pro Bono ParticipationStill Lags, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
19, 1994, at 1, 1.
41. See id. at 4.
42. See Annual Pro Bono Reporting: A Look at Texas and Florida, 59 TEX. B.J.
1230, 1230 (1994); Mark Hansen, Reporting Pro Bono, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 16, 16.
43. Calculations are based on the surveys cited supra in notes 40-42. In the 100
firms with the largest gross profits, the average contribution per lawyer was 40
hours per year. See Tom Schoenberg, The Ups and Downs of Pro Bono, LEGAL
TIES, June 24, 1996, at S37; see also Richard L. Abel, Revisioning Lawyers, in
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: AN OVERVIEW 1, 14 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds.,
1995) (noting that lawyers' charitable activities are "quantitatively insignificant,
whether measured in long hours or cash contributions to legal aid").
44. See Jun Shen, Second Thoughts on Advertising, RECORDER (San Francisco),
Oct. 6, 1997, at 4, 9 (noting that in 1996 lawyers spent over $750 million on television commercials and advertising in the Yellow Pages).
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three million dollar "communications" campaign to increase
Americans' understanding of the role of lawyers and the justice
system.45 So too, the California Trial Lawyers Association (the
"Association"), in an effort to restore "public confidence" and
counter "unfavorable media attention," worked out a rebate
arrangement with a bank credit card.4" Under this arrangement,
a percentage of every participating California bar member's
fees would support the Association's public relations
charges and
47
program.

The premise of such efforts-that popular ignorance and a bad
press are the central problems-is highly dubious. Indeed, the
bar's own commissioned research suggests the contrary. Most
Americans have had direct contact with attorneys.48 Three-quarters of the public have retained lawyers, and half deal with
them on a "semi-regular basis."49 Moreover, the individuals
most likely to have negative impressions of attorneys are those
with the most knowledge and direct personal contact with lawyers.5" Corporate clients are among lawyers' harshest critics.5 ' By
contrast, those who know relatively little about the legal profession and the legal system, and who get their information primarily from television, have the most favorable impressions." Such perceptions stand to reason in light of other research indicating that most television portrayals of lawyers are
positive." Contrary to bar leaders' assumptions, the ratio of fa-

45. See Saundra Torry, A Million-Dollar Campaign to Love the Lawyers, WASH.
POST, May 24, 1993, at F7.

46. Letter from Ray Bourkis, Vice President, and J. Gay Gwilliam, President, California Trial Lawyers Ass'n, to Members of the California Bar (undated) (on file with
author).
47. See
48. See
49. Id.
50. See
51. See
SPIRIT OF
SIONALISM

id.
Hengstler, supra note 5, at 61.
id. at 62.
IN THE
...
COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR ASS,
PUBLIC SERVICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFES(1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 254 (1987) ("[OInly 67% of corporate

users of legal services rated 'all or most' lawyers as deserving to be called
'professionals.").
52. See Hengstler, supra note 5, at 61-62.
53. See Thorn Weidlich, A Cynical Age Sees Few Heroes in Its Lawyers, NATL L.J.,
Nov. 19, 1993, at S26.
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vorable to unfavorable televised portraits of attorneys ranges
between six-to-one and ten-to-one during the periods
surveyed.' Although lawyers probably are right that newspaper
coverage is skewed in the opposite direction, much of the adverse press coverage is consistent with people's personal experience. The problem, in short, is more with the.rdality of lawyering than with its image.
Yet finding solutions is more difficult than the public typically
acknowledges A large part of popular dislike of lawyers stems
from aspects of the legal system that are not primarily the fault
of lawyers or that are not readily changed. Courts are overburdened and underfunded," and some discontent is inherent in
even the best system of dispute resolution. The contexts in
which people encounter the profession are often unpleasant: divorce, bankruptcies, personal injuries, or contractual disputes.
This unpleasantness inevitably affects perceptions of lawyers
who are profiting from others' miseries." Attorneys also deliver
unwelcome messages about the law, so they readily become
scapegoats when the justice system fails to deliver justice as
participants perceive it.
America's adversarial system compounds popular frustration.
Litigation is rarely a win-win enterprise, and losers are apt to
put some of the blame on lawyers. The targets of resentment are
not, however, only-or even primarily-the parties' own attorneys. Nearly two-thirds of surveyed individuals are satisfied
with their lawyers.57 The public's major grievances involve perceived abuses by other peoples' lawyers and a system that fails
to prevent them. As one columnist notes, "[elveryone would hate
doctors too, if everytime you went in the hospital your doctor
was trying to take your appendix out, and the other guy's doctor
was standing right there trying to put it back in."58
It is, however, by no means clear that the public would prefer

54. See id.
55. See Don J. DeBenedictis, Struggling Toward Recovery, A.B. J., Aug. 1994, at
50, 50.
56. See When You Need a Lawyer, supra note 15, at 34.
57. See Hengstler, supra note 5, at 61.
58. Jon Carroll, He's Not Heavy; He's My Attorney, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 1995, at
El0, available in 1995 WL 5283554 (quoting law student John Hou).
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a substantially different structure in which lawyers played a
substantially different role. In fact, Americans are ambivalent.
Many dislike attorneys for zealously protecting criminal defendants.59 But when individuals imagine themselves facing criminal charges, a zealous champion is precisely what they have in
mind.6" So too, in other legal contexts, much of what people dislike about opposing counsel is what they value in their own. One
of the most positive traits that the public associates with lawyers
is that their first priority is loyalty to their clients.6 ' Yet one of
the most negative traits is lawyers' willingness to manipulate the
system on behalf of clients without regard to right or wrong.62
People hate a hired gun until they need one of their own.
As legal scholar Robert Post notes, this ambivalence reflects
deeper cultural contradictions.' We use law to preserve both individual liberty and social responsibility, and "we use lawyers
both to express our longing for a common good, and to express
our distaste for collective discipline."" Legal disputes and the
profession that choreographs them serve as irritating reminders
of the tension between those values.
The public is similarly ambivalent about the tension between
money and justice. Americans dislike the fact that lawyers are
for sale and that law is accessible only to those who can afford
it.6" But Americans also dislike efforts to remedy that imbalance.
Justice is what we proclaim on courthouse entrances, not in
redistributive policies.66 Our nation spends far less than other
Western industrial societies on government-subsidized legal representation. Even before massive recent cutbacks in federal
legal services programs,68 about three-quarters of the legal needs

59. See Samborn, supra note 5, at 20.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 22.
62. See Robert C. Post, On the Popular Image of the Lawyer: Reflections in a
Dark Glass, 75 CAL. L. REV. 379, 380 (1987).
63. See id. at 380-89.
64. Id. at 386.
65. See Budiansky et al., supra note 8, at 52.
66. See James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 56, 56.
67. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHIcs 737 (2d ed. 1995).
68. See Claudia MacLachlan, Legal Services Fights Back, NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1996,
at Al.
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of low income households remained unmet.69 As one Denver legal
aid attorney has observed, "the only thing less popular than a
poor person these days is a poor person with a lawyer."" We
lament the inequalities in our justice system but refuse to support policies that would address them. Most Americans find it
easier to fault the bar's greed than to acknowledge their own.
Although part of the public's discontent with lawyers reflects
misplaced or displaced frustrations, not all its complaints should
be so readily dismissed. Many criticisms of professional conduct
and regulatory processes have a strong basis in fact. On matters
such as excessive fees, unresponsive disciplinary structures, and
overbroad protections of the professional monopoly, the public
does not appear ambivalent, and its concerns do not seem unwarranted. 1 Even on issues like zealous advocacy, where popular opinion is more divided, the individuals who have the most
contact with lawyers and knowledge about their practices are
the least satisfied. 2
In short, the problem on some important issues of professional
regulation is not so much that the public is uninformed or undecided, but rather that it is unorganized and uninvolved. For the
vast majority of Americans, such issues are not a priority. Most
people's direct contact with lawyers is limited. Routine users are
usually organizational clients, who do not bear personally the
costs of conduct that they find objectionable." Although egregious abuses occasionally galvanize the public into action,
nonlawyers seldom have sufficient incentives to organize around
questions involving regulation of lawyers.

69. See ROY W. RESSE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, INSTITUTE FOR SURVEY RESEARCH
AT TEmPLE UNiVERSITY, LEGAL NEEDS AMONG Low-INCOME AND MODERATE-INCOME
HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY
21 (1994), reprinted in AMERICAN BAR ASSN, FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 21 (1994).

70. Brian Sullivan et al., Obiter Dicta: So They Say, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 36,
37 (quoting Jonathon Asher, executive director of the Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver).
71. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 67, at 693-96; Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 694-96 (1994); Darlene Ricker, Greed,
Ignorance and Overbilling, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 62, 62-66.
72. See Hengstler, supra note 5, at 62; supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
73. See Hengstler, supra note 5, at 61; supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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By contrast, the legal profession has every incentive to pursue
regulatory concerns and to block initiatives that advance public
interests at the expense of its own. Such problems are by no
means unique to this regulatory context, but they are compounded by the bar's pivotal role in American policymaking. Unless
some substantial constituencies within the profession-practitioners, judges, or legislators-share a reform agenda, its prospects are likely to be limited.
Yet the conditions for building such constituencies have seldom been better. Discontent within the profession is pervasive
and increasing. And at least part of lawyers' disaffection arises
from the same conditions that fuel popular criticism. The challenge lies in redirecting that frustration to serve a constructive
agenda and in identifying ways to bridge the gap between professional and public interests.

III. THE PROBLEM FROM THE PROFESSION'S PERSPECTIVE
For the American legal profession, these are the best of times
and the worst of times.74 Not only is law the nation's highest
paying profession, it is still a preferred route to public office and
political power. In no other country do lawyers exercise such
significant influence over social and economic policy.75 And in no
other historical era has the legal profession been more diverse
and more open to talent irrespective of race, gender, religion,
and ethnicity."
Disaffection with legal practice, however, has never been more
apparent. A majority of lawyers report that they would choose
another career if they had the decision to make over, and three-

74. For a similar diagnosis, see Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubeck, Introduction: New Problems and New Paradigms in Studies of the Legal Profession, in
LAWYERS' IDEALS / LAWYERS' PRACTICES 1, 9 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992).
75. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 283-84.
76. Since the early 1960s, the representation of women in the profession has
grown from under 3% to over 20%, and the representation of lawyers of color has
increased from about 1% to almost 8%. See COMIflSSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFES-

SION, AMERICAN BAR ASs!N, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS FACTOR 5 (1995); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry
into the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Education Debt, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 829, 860-65 (1995).
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quarters would not want their children to become lawyers."
About one-quarter of young attorneys are dissatisfied with their
current position, and a slightly greater number are dissatisfied
with the practice of law in general.7
The symptoms of professional malaise are also reflected in
health-related difficulties. An estimated one-third of American
attorneys suffer from depression or from alcohol or drug addiction.79 Lawyers have about three times the rate of depression and
almost twice the rate of substance abuse as other Americans.8 0
Although the primary sources of discontent vary somewhat
across different areas of practice and demographic groups, common themes emerge. Lawyers are unhappy with the culture of
the profession, the structure of their workplaces, and the performance of the justice system.
At the most general level, many lawyers express concern
about the "decline of professionalism." That phrase captures a
range of more specific complaints, such as increasing commercialism and competition and decreasing civility and collegiality.
The perception of law as a craft and calling is under siege, and
the consequence is an eroding sense of public service and cultural authority. About three-quarters of surveyed members of the
profession believe that attorneys are more money-conscious, half
think they are less civil, and a third report that they are more
likely to lie than in earlier eras.8 ' Declining public respect also
fuels lawyers' rising sense of status anxiety. Less than a fifth of
Americans view the legal profession as very prestigious, and
that perception is itself a major source of attorneys' discon-

77. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 85; Nancy McCarthy, Pessimism for the Future, CAL. B.J., Nov. 1994, at 1, 1.
78. AMERICAN BAR ASSN, YOUNG LAWYERS DIVISION SURVEY: CAREER SATISFACTION
13 (1995) [hereinafter CAREER SATISFACTION].

79. See Just One for the Road, CAL. LAW., July 1993, at 17, 17.
80. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 87; Blane Workie, Note, Chemical Dependency
and the Legal Profession: Should Addiction to Drugs and Alcohol Ward Off Heavy
Discipline, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1357 (1996); Michael J.. Sweeney, It's About

Time: Lawyer Assistance Programs, COMPLEAT LAW., Spring 1996, at 17; see also
Andrew Herrman, Depressing News for Lawyers, CH. SUN-TIMES, Sept. 13, 1991, at
1, available in 1991 WL 8720774 (noting that lawyers top the list of professionals
most likely to suffer from major depression).
81. See Hanson, supra note 32, at 35.
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tent. 2 This sense of decline colors prominent accounts of professional culture, such as The Lost Lawyer, by Yale Law School
Dean Anthony Kronman, and The Betrayed Profession, by Washington practitioner Sol Linowitz.' As subsequent discussion suggests, some widespread assumptions about decline are historically questionable, but they nonetheless reflect an important fact
about modern professional life.' Practitioners feel adrift. To borrow one bar association's description, it is as if lawyers are
"looking for their lost wigs."'
That search is bumping up against several recent developments in the market for legal services.86 Increases in the number
of lawyers have increased the level of professional competition
and diminished the force of informal community sanctions. Price
consciousness among corporate clients, together with the relaxation of bar restrictions on competitive practices within and
across professions, also have intensified economic pressures in
private practice. One result has been a strong emphasis on the
bottom line, which squeezes the time available for pursuit of
other professional values, such as mentoring and public service.
A further consequence of increased competition has been increased instability in lawyer-client relationships and increased
constraints on professional independence. Corporate clients today appear more likely to shop for representation on particular
matters, rather than to build long-term relationships with firms
that supply representation for most needs.8 7 As private practice
becomes more competitive, specialized, and transactional, lawyers face intense pressures to satisfy clients' short term desires
at the expense of other values. Without a stable relationship of

82. See Klein, supra note 35, at A6; supra note 29 and accompanying text.
83. KRONMAN, supra note 3; LINOWTz WITH MAYER, supra note 3.
84. See infra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.
85. Committee on the Profession, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Is
Professionalism Declining?, 47 RECORD 129, 131 (1992) (referring to statement of
Dean Norman Redlich).
86. For discussion of these forces, see MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991); GLENDON, supra note 23, at 76; KRONMAN, supra note 3;
MICHAEL H. TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 11, 15, 85-105, 151 (1997);
Carl T. Bogus, The Death of an Honorable Profession, 71 IND. L.J. 911 (1996).
87. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 25; KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 276; TROTTER,
supra note 86, at 85.
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trust and confidence, it is risky for counsel to protest unreasonable demands or to deliver an unwelcome message about what
legal rules or legal ethics require.8 8
Part of the dishonesty, incivility, and acrimony that lawyers
find troubling in current practice seems driven by these profit
dynamics. As Judge Richard Posner has pointed out,
"[c]ompetitive markets are no fun at all for most sellers."8 9 Law
is not an exception, and fun is not the only casualty.
Legal practice has become more competitive within as well as
among law firms.o A steady rise in costs, coupled with periodic
declines in demand, have led to greater insecurity in private
practice. More public information about law firm salaries has
intensified financial rivalries and lateral defections.9" The desire
to attract and retain the most productive attorneys has kept
compensation levels relatively high, but the profession pays the
price in other ways. Partnership means less and is harder to
obtain. Fewer associates receive promotions. Unproductive partners are squeezed out. Productive ones are lured away. As working relations become more transient and more strained, fewer
lawyers have a stake in investing in their professional culture.
These trends are reflected and reinforced by the "eat what you
kill" approach to law firm compensation. Especially in large and
mid-sized firms, the greatest rewards go to the organizations'
"finders," not its "minders" or "grinders."92 The partners who
attract clients are at the top of the food chain. Lawyers with
different priorities-craft, mentoring, public service-lack comparable leverage.
Other forces are further straining the professional culture.

88. See COMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE STATE
BAR OF CAL., THE FUTURE OF THE CALIFORNIA BAR: FINAL REPORT 50-52 (1995);
James M. Altman, Modem Litigators and Lawyer-Statesmen, 103 YALE L.J. 1031,
1065 (1994) (reviewing KRONMAN, supra note 3).
89. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 92 (1995).
90. For discussion of the increased competitiveness described below, see WALT
BACHMAN, LAW V. LIFE: WHAT LAWYERS ARE AFRAID TO SAY ABOUT THE LEGAL PROFESSION 100-11 (1995); GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 86; GLENDON, supra note 23,
at 24-26; KRONMAN, supra note 3 at 271-314; TROTTER, supra note 86.
91. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 31-32; KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 280-81.
92. See Robert L. Nelson, Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure
of Large Law Firms, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 95, 118.
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New entrants to the profession reflect increasing diversity across
race, gender, class, and national origin, but many members of
traditionally underrepresented groups do not find a supportive
workplace." Moreover, lawyers from all backgrounds are encountering greater pressures. As the likelihood of partnership diminishes, the competition among young lawyers intensifies. Incoming associates in large firms are wined and dined, and then
worked to death. In smaller firms and solo practice, the rising
number of lawyers compounds the difficulties of attracting clients, which heightens economic insecurity. In legal services,
public defender, and public interest practice, the overwhelming
inadequacy of resources encourages high stress and frequent
burnout.'
For too many practitioners, "quality of life is a non-issue.
What life?"9" Billable hour requirements have increased dramatically over the last two decades, and what has not changed
are the number of hours in the day. Most lawyers now bill over
200 hours a month, and to charge honestly at that level, they
need to work about a sixty-hour week." In large firms, where
hourly demands can be even higher, all work and no play is fast
becoming the norm rather than the exception.
What loses out is not just leisure. Lawyers also have fewer
opportunities for pro bono service, civic involvement, and experiences that build professional judgment and sustain a professional culture.9 7 The scope for crucial personal relationships is also
narrowing. Almost half of American attorneys feel that they do
not have enough time for their families."
93. See COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 76, at 5; COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION & COMMISSION ON OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITIES IN THE PROFESSION, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE BURDENS OF BOTH, THE PRIVILEGES OF NEITHER: A REPORT OF THE MULTICULTURAL WOMEN'S ATTORNEYS NETWORK 9, 14-27 (1994).
94. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1239, 1240-41 (1993).
95. LORRAINE DUSKY, STILL UNEQUAL 172 (1996).
96. See id. at 171-72; Bogus, supra note 86, at 925-26; Nancy D. Holt, Are Longer

Hours Here to Stay?, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 62, 64; Benjamin Sells, Stressed-Out
Attorneys, S.F. DAILY J., May 25, 1994, at 3A.

97. See Bogus, supra note 86, at 926.
98. See Sells, supra note 96, at 3A. Over half of surveyed partners believe they
work too hard. See Klein, supra note 3, at Al.
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For employed women, who still spend about twice as much
time on family responsibilities as employed men, the puritan
ethic run amok poses special difficulties.99 Excessive hours are
the leading cause of professional dissatisfaction among surveyed
female practitioners.' 0 Recent reports on women's status in law
firms describe, in deadening detail, the sweatshop schedules for
many full-time attorneys and the glass ceilings for part-time
practitioners.' Female lawyers speak of not seeing their children awake for a week and of leaving their social life on perpetual hold.0 2 For some disenchanted associates, the only thing
worse than not finding a job is finding one. Those with the
greatest family commitments often drift off the partnership
track, leaving behind a decision making structure insulated from
their concerns.'3 Such patterns help account for the persistent
underrepresentation of women in positions with greatest professional status and reward. 3 4
The problem in some of these settings is not only the quantity
of work but also the quality. Intellectual challenge is the main
reason most attorneys choose law as a career, and, for a sub"Doing
stantial minority, it falls well short of expectations.'

99. See DEBORAH

L.

RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALI-

TY 6, 149-53 (1997).
100. See AMERICAN BAR ASSN, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT: THE
EMERGING CRISIS IN THE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LIVES-ITS IMPACT ON
LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES 3, 9-11 (1991) [hereinafter BREAKING POINT];

Cynthia Fuchs Epstein et al., Glass Ceilings and Open Doors: Women's Advancement
in the Legal Profession, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 387-88, 391-99, 411 (1995); Women
in the Law Survey: Analyzing Job Dissatisfaction, CAL. LAW., Jan. 1990, at 84, 84-85
[hereinafter Women in the Law Survey]. See generally HARVARID WOMEN'S LAW ASSN,
PRESUMED EQUAL: WHAT AMERICA'S TOP WOMEN LAWYERS REALLY THINK ABOUT

THEIR FIRMS (Suzanne Nossel & Lisa Westfall eds., 1995) (reporting survey findings).
101. See Epstein et al., supra note' 100, at 386, 406-07; Women in the Law Survey,
supra note 100, at 84-85.
102. See HARVARD WOMEN'S LAW ASSN, supra note 100, passim; Epstein et al., supra note 100, at 390-95.
103. See DUSKY, supra note 95, at 193-207; Epstein et al., supra note 100, at 393-95.
104. Women constitute over 40% of law students, law firm associates, and in-house
counsel lawyers, but only 13% of law firm partners and 17% of heads of legal departments. See COMMISSION ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, supra note 76, at 5-13;

Susan Saltonstall Duncan, What Women Need to Make it to the Top, AM. LAW., Jan.Feb. 1996, at 9.
105. See YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE STATE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 1990 55-61 (1991).
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litigation" in the style to which many practitioners have become
accustomed means endless cycles of scutwork. As Professor Stephen Gillers has noted, too many lawyers find too much of their
practice "nasty, narrow [,] ... relentlessly repetitive, and strangely
unconnected to a . .

.

dimly recollected purpose in choosing

lo6

law.
This lack of larger purpose accounts for the greatest gap between expectations and experience among American lawyers. In
the ABA's mid-1990s survey of career satisfaction, less than a fifth
of surveyed attorneys felt that legal practice had "very well" lived
up to their expectations in contributing to the social good.'0 7 A
quarter felt that law had "not at all" satisfied this aspiration.' 8
Lawyers' explanations for that failure partly overlap the public's explanations. According to both groups, much of the problem
involves dishonest and uncivil opposing counsel and an unduly
expensive and unwieldy justice system. Lawyers also blame biased and incompetent judges, greedy and ungrateful clients, and
norms of professional responsibility that are undemanding and
underenforced109 A substantial number of practitioners are unhappy with bar disciplinary structures and with the misconduct
and hucksterism that they appear powerless to prevent."0
All of these trends have left many lawyers disaffected or disengaged. As Professor Bruce Ackerman has noted, although today's
practitioners will spend most of their waking hours at work,
they will save their ultimate concerns for something else: family, friends, the bassoon, some little cottage in the Maine woods.

106. Stephen Gillers, Great Expectations: Conceptions of Lawyers at the Angle of
Entry, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 662, 669 (1983).
107. See CAREER SATISFACTION, supra note 78, at 11.
108. See id.
109. See DEBORAH L. ARRON, RUNNING FROM THE LAW: WHY GOOD LAWYERS ARE
GETrING OUT OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 25 (1989); BACHMAN, supra note 90, at 112-

24; Bogus, supra note 86, at 913; Hengstler, supra note 5, at 62-64; Marcia M.
McBrien, FAX Poll: Unhappy Lawyers Cite Hard Work, Few Rewards, MICH. LAW.
WKLY., Dec. 26, 1994, at 1, 32.
110. See McCarthy, supra note 77, at 6. Fifty-four percent of surveyed California
lawyers believe lawyer advertising is contributing to a decline in professionalism,
and only 20% believe the bar's disciplinary system does a good job of regulating
unethical behavior. See id.
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Even if successful, this kind of life will have no unity to it. There
will be great moments, hopefully; but the whole will be less
than the sum of its parts. At the center... there will be a vast
professional hole-what was it that I spent most of my waking
hours worrying about?..'
Many lawyers are now asking that question. And many are looking for new answers.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE PROBLEM AS THE PROFESSION SEES IT
"No social role encourages such ambitious moral aspirations as
the lawyers'," observes legal ethics expert William Simon." 2
"And no social role so consistently disappoints the aspirations it
encourages.""' Yet the persistence of this disappointment is alternatively overlooked and overstated in professionalism debates.
Many discussions proceed with no historical memory, or one
that is highly selective. In these accounts, the past functions as
a mythic ideal: Commentators invoke what Marc Galanter has
termed the "golden age of legal nostalgia.""' Here, lawyerstatesmen ruled, if not the earth, at least the profession. Then
of crass commercialism,
came the Fall, and our own Dark Age
5
uncivil tactics, and amoral advocacy."
When exactly this transformation took place remains unclear,
because few commentators are interested in historical precision.
Those who are interested cast doubt on conventional assumptions. For example, although commentators generally paint legal
practice at the turn of the century in rosy hues, Professor Mary
Ann Glendon identifies much to dislike about what then passed
for professionalism."' Some of the bar's best and brightest
made their reputations "using every tactic in the book (and

111. Bruce A. Ackerman, Commencement Remarks, YALE L. REP.,- Spring/Summer
1982, at 6, 6.
112. WILLLM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS
(forthcoming Apr. 1998) (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
113. Id.

114.
DICK.
115.
116.

Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100
L. REV. 549 (1996).
See id. at 552-58.
See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 57.
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many that were not) to help clients bust unions, consolidate
monopolies,.., and obtain favorable treatment from [corrupt]
judges."117
In fact, virtually every era that modern commentators applaud attracted its own share of critics with concerns often paralleling those of today. In a 1905 address to the Harvard Ethical
Society, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis warned that
lawyers were losing public respect because they were also losing
their commitment to public service and their moral independence from clients."' Several decades later, Supreme Court
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone similarly worried that the economic
pressures of practice had transformed the profession into an "obsequious servant of business,.., tainted.., with the morals
and manners of the market place in its most anti-social manifestations.""' "More and more," Stone noted, "the amount of [a
lawyer's] income is the measure of professional success." 2 '
Even sweatshop hours, which are usually taken as a distinctively corrosive feature of contemporary practice, have long provoked
concern. In 1928, Arthur Train published a novel featuring a
with partners who "come
Wall Street firm that "never sleep[s],"
12 1
early, stay late, and die young."

Of course, some current problems are more acute. Although
commercialism and long hours are scarcely novel concerns, their
meanings have changed, and not for the better. However, on
many issues of professionalism, such as lawyers' public service,
honesty, greed, or capacity for judgment, we lack information for
accurate historical comparisons.
Undaunted by the absence of evidence, recent bar commentary
presents impressionistic assertions as self-evident truths. "[Tihe
spirit of public service is not what it once was," announces a

117. Id.

118. See David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 717-18 (1988).
119. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7
(1934).

120. Id. at 6.
121. MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, LAW AND LAWYERS IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 4748 (1980) (quoting ARTHUR TRAIN, AMBITION 70-72 (1928)).
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New York Committee on the Profession.' But we have no
adequate records of what it used to be. Nor can we be sure
whether many other commonly cited problems are getting worse
or just more visible in a world with more lawyers and more
publicity surrounding their conduct."
Moreover, on at least some measures of professionalism, much
is getting better. Increased competition also has encouraged increased efficiency and responsiveness to client concerns." The
result for many consumers has been higher quality services at
lower prices.'
So too, the bar's self-consciousness about issues of professional
responsibility is itself a sign of progress. So is the attention these
matters now receive in law schools. When I entered the profession
some two decades ago, legal ethics was a recent, unwelcome, and
scarcely visible intruder on the educational landscape. I took no
course in professional responsibility, encountered no bar exam
questions on the subject, and found only passing references in the
legal literature. Much has changed over the last twenty years,
and the profession is now at least grappling with problems that it
long failed even to acknowledge as problems.
The same is true of other issues involving professional conduct.
Race and gender bias are cases in point. Washington practitioner
Sol Linowitz, in his recent account of the Betrayed Profession,
recalls that his law school class in the 1950s had only two women. 6 Neither he, nor most of his male classmates, questioned
the skewed ratio at the time, although they did feel somewhat
uncomfortable when their two female colleagues were around. As
Linowitz now acknowledges with rueful candor, "[i]t never occurred to us to wonder whether they felt uncomfortable." 27 In
today's climate, much progress remains to be made, but at least

122. Committee on the Profession, supra note 85, at 139.
123. See Galanter, supra note 114, at 558-59.
124. See LINOW1TZ WITH MAYER, supra note 3, at 190-94; Amy Stevens, Law Firm
Fat Threatened by a Lean Network, WALL ST. J., July 8, 1994, at Bi; Peter D.
Zeughauser, Using Alternative Arrangements to Improve Client Relationships, Law
Firm Profitability and Results, LAW PRACT. MGMT., Apr. 1997, at 22, 22.
125. See Zeughauser, supra note 124, at 22.
126. See LINOWITZ WITH MAYER, supra note 3, at 6.
127. Id.
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such questions are on the agenda. Gender, race, and sexual orientation bias persist, but they are attracting increased initiatives
judicial commissions,
from a wide spectrum of bar associations,
128
lawyers.
employing
organizations
and
We have moved in similar directions on other issues, particularly access to legal services. Although, as earlier discussion
indicated, 129 lawyers' average pro bono contributions to the
poor leave much to be desired, they are increasing
substantially. 30 Until recently, little pro bono assistance went
to systematically underepresented interests.' The vast majority of beneficiaries were family, friends, and organizations serving primarily middle and upper-income groups-hospitals, museums, Boy Scouts, Jaycees, and so forth.'32 No law schools required students to engage in pro bono activity, and few had
voluntary placement programs encouraging such involvement. 13 By contrast, today's profession is far more likely to engage in poverty-related pro bono work.
It is also not self evident that the role of lawyer-statesmen is
eroding. The legal profession remains our nation's primary
source of governmental and public interest leaders."s4 Lawyers
have been at the forefront of all the major social movements of
the last half century. In short, we have little evidence for the
common view, summarized by former Chief Justice Warren
128. See, e.g., Maijorie E. Gross, Updated Rules on Judicial Conduct, N.Y. L.J.,
May 14, 1996, at 1; Michael A. Riccardi, Anti-Bias PrinciplesProposed to State Bar,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 15, 1996, at 1; Susan Skiles, Panel to Prod Firms on
Minority Hiring, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., July 14, 1992, at 1; sources cited supra notes
93 and 100.
129. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
130. See, e.g., William J. Dean, Law Firm Activities, N.Y. L.J., July 9, 1997, at 3;
Esther F. Lardent, Pro Bono Wave Hits More Cities, NATL L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at
A23; Patty Reinert, Pro Bono Work Increases, but ParticipationIs Still Low, DAILY
REC. (Baltimore), Apr. 2, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL 3166067; Gary Spencer,
Total Lawyers Volunteering Flat but Hours Devoted to Pro Bono Increase, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 22, 1992, at 1.
131. See Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Activities of Private Practice
Lawyers, 61 A.B.A. J. 1388, 1390-91 (1975).
132. See sources cited in Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 699 (1981).
133. See LINOWITZ WITH MAYER, supra note 3, at 128-32.
134. See KRONMAN, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that lawyers "continue to dominate
our public life, at all levels of government, exactly as before").
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Burger, that professionalism is in a "steady decline,"'3 5 or has
reached a crisis of "epidemic proportions.""' A significant gap
has always existed between professional ideals and professional
practice, and in many respects, the present is not demonstrably
worse than the past.
It does not, however, follow that the current sense of disquiet
is inappropriate or unimportant. Many commentators' ready dismissal of the "professionalism problem" is as troubling as their
exaggeration. Now that the professionalism campaign has a national office, journal, and logo, critics wonder whether a motto
and mascot can be far behind. 37 Yet such debunking can often
reinforce cynicism or resignation. 8' Indeed, the bar as a whole
seems deeply pessimistic and uncharacteristically passive in the
face of its own problems. About two-thirds of surveyed attorneys
predict that collegiality and civility will continue to decline, and
almost three-quarters think that the practice of law will grow
more stressful.'3 9 Yet few seem to believe that these trends are
within their power to change.
In commenting on that fact, lawyer and psychotherapist Benjamin Sells observed that:
[A] majority of lawyers apparently have found ways to displace their responsibility for their own profession.... Many
lawyers seem never to have even entertained the idea that
they could actually do something about how law is practiced. A more typical approach seems to be for lawyers
to.... become focused primarily on their self interests ...
and live their work lives with a kind of up-and-out
fatalism."

135. Warren E. Burger, Attorney, Cross-Examine Thyself, L.. DAILY J., July 28,
1988, at 4.
136. Warren E. Burger, The Decline of Professionalism, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 949,
949 (1995).
137. See Thomas L. Shaffer, InauguralHoward Lichtenstein Lecture in Legal Ethics:
Lawyer Professionalism as Moral Argument, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 393, 395 (1990/91).
138. See GLENDON, supra note 23, at 82 (criticizing the "scholarly orgy of debunking" lawyers for not living up to their professed ideals).
139. See McCarthy, supra note 77, at'l.
140. Benjamin Sells, Lawyers Aren't as Trapped as They Think, S.F. DAILY J., Sept.
12, 1994, at 5.
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The central problem facing the American legal profession is its
own unwillingness to come to terms with what the problems are.
At issue are competing values and concerns. Yet bar commentary
on professionalism tends to paper over two central conflicts: the
tensions between lawyers' economic and noneconomic interests
and the tensions between professional and public interests.
Money is, of course, at the root of both conflicts. Although this
fact is too obvious to overlook entirely, it is also a truth too uncomfortable to acknowledge fully. So various strategies of confession and avoidance have become common. For example, the
ABA's Commission on Professionalism framed the question:
"Has our profession abandoned principle for profit, professional"The answer," it turns out, "cannot
ism for commercialism?"
be a simple yes or no."' Like other bar commentators, the
Commission believes that the pursuit of profit in an increasingly
competitive market has compromised professional values.
The solution is for lawyers to rise above their baser instincts.
say no to greed"--appears to have fallen someSuch advice--'just
4
what short.'
Although lawyers often acknowledge that greed is part of the
problem, they generally manage to place responsibility anywhere
and everywhere else. In no context is this more apparent than
law firms. Partners blame mercenary and unrealistic associates,
while associates blame mercenary and unfeeling partners. In
fact, there is plenty of blame to go around.
According to a recent American Lawyer overview of law firm
economics, "It's hard to find any partner who thinks that firstyear salaries make any economic sense." " 5 The irrationality of
current compensation structures began, rationally enough, when
competition for the ablest new associates pushed starting salaries well above what hourly billing rates justified. 1 6 Because
firms have been under other competitive pressures not to raise

141. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 51, at 251.
142.
143.
144.
text.
145.
146.

Id.
See id. at 259-61.
See Shaffer, supra note 137, at 411-14; infra notes 145-54 and accompanying
John E. Morris, The New Seller's Market, AM. LAW., Oct. 1996, at 7.
See id. at 7-9.
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those rates, the choice has been either to decrease partner profits or to raise associates' work load.'47 Predictably, most partners have opted for the latter choice. But they have blamed the
resulting Dickensonian schedules on associates who seem to
prefer high salaries to a decent quality of life.
Managing partners often report experiences similar to the one
Walt Bachman describes in Law v. Life. 48 When his firm attempted to freeze both hours and starting salaries, applicants
flocked to other firms. Many of these young associates were predictably miserable when they got there. But that, from the
partners' perspective, is the associates' own fault. Law, like life,
rarely offers a free lunch. New attorneys can't have it both
ways-high salaries and low hours-so they need to think more
carefully about which way they want it.
From the associates' perspective, the tradeoff looks somewhat
different. Most leave law school with high debt burdens and little, if any, experience of what life is like when billing at 2000
hours.5 0 Many young lawyers do not yet have demanding
family commitments, and the allure of creature comforts after
years of genteel poverty often is irresistible. From their perspective, the way for employers to avoid unmanageable workloads is
to reduce income at the top, not the bottom of the hierarchy.
Why should so many senior attorneys get so much more money
than juniors for essentially similar work?
The difficulty, of course, is that firms that allow incomes to
fall below market rates run the same risks of defection at the
upper levels that they do at the entry levels. Profitable partners
who feel undercompensated have become increasingly willing to
move, often taking clients and promising associates with
them.'' Firm managers worry that if their workplaces begin to
value quality of life over profitability, then they will end up with
a disproportionate share of shirkers. Particularly at the associate level, a willingness to work long hours often functions as a
147. See BACHMAN, supra note 90, at 103-04.
148. BACHMAN, supra note 90.
149. See id. at 106.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 104-05; GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 86, at 54-55; TROTrER, supra note 86, at 85-86.
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proxy for commitment and assumes major importance in promotion decisions.'52
The result is a prisoners' dilemma. Attorneys often end up
working far more demanding schedules than they would like,
but find themselves within institutional structures that offer no
alternative. One consequence, as the California Commission on
the Future of the Legal Professsion candidly acknowledges, is
that lawyers become habituated to "extraordinary incomes."' 53
In the process, luxuries become necessities, wealth becomes
critical to self-esteem, and relative salaries become ways of
"keeping score."'5 4
Yet that process is often self defeating. Considerable research
suggests that people overvalue income as a way of achieving
satisfaction.'55 Above the poverty line, the cliche is correct;
money doesn't buy happiness. 55 Part of the reason is that
many crucial factors affecting satisfaction are beyond individual
control, such as biological predispositions, childhood experiences,
disabling disease, or the deaths of loved ones.' 5' But the other
principal circumstances affecting happiness are not directly
related to income. They involve the quality of family relationships, the support of friends, a sense of effectively performing
key tasks, and a feeling of control over one's fate.'5 8 Of course,
income may influence some of these factors. The ability to afford
good childcare, neighborhoods, and education affects family
relationships and people's evaluation of their performance as

152. See Ren~e M. Landers et al., Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 329, 329 (1996).
153. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE

52.
154. GLENDON, supra note 23, at 31; see Shaffer, supra note 137, at 411-12.
155. See Daniel Goleman, Forget Money: Nothing Can Buy Happiness, Some Researchers Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1996, at C1.
156. See DAVID G. MYERS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 31-38 (1992); Robert E. Lane,
The Road Not Taken: Friendship, Consumerism and Happiness, 8 CRITICAL REV. 521,
527 (1994) [hereinafter Lane, Road Not Taken]; Robert E. Lane, Does Money Buy Happiness?, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1993, at 56, 57 [hereinafter Lane, Happiness?].
157. See Goleman, supra note 155, at C1.
158. See Antonia Abbey & Frank M. Andrews, Modeling the Psychological Determinants of Life Quality, in RESEARCH ON THE QUALITY OF LIFE 85, 105 (1986); Lane,
Road Not Taken, supra note 156, at 545; Lane, Happiness?, supra note 156, at 58;
James Q. Wilson, Wealth and Happiness, 8 CRITICAL REV. 555, 560, 563 (1994).
STATE BAR OF CAL., supra note 88, at
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parents. But most individuals overestimate how much money
matters. They generally believe that twenty-five percent more
income would significantly increase their happiness.' 9 It usually does not. People quickly adjust to higher earnings, and their
expectations and desires increase accordingly. 6 ' The priority
that many lawyers and law firms attach to salaries compromises
other goals that are more central to satisfaction, such as time for
friends and families, and choice of work that is morally and intellectually satisfying.
Lawyers also face a related tradeoff that the professionalism
debate fails to acknowledge. In the bar's idealized vision of professional life, lawyers can expect both moral independence and
worldly rewards, such as power, wealth, and prominence. In actual practice, however, these interests are frequently in tension.
Historical and cross-cultural research suggests that in contexts
where the legal profession has maintained greater autonomy
from clients and has recognized greater ethical obligations to
nonclient interests than the contemporary American bar, attorneys have secured less income and influence than they now enjoy. 6 ' Moral independence may bring lawyers an important
measure of social esteem and self respect, but it comes at a price.
Professionalism rhetoric tends to paper over this conflict by
making a virtue out of expedience. Under prevailing norms of
professional responsibility, morally independent lawyers have
little scope for moral independence within their professional
role. Rather, their preeminent ethical obligation is fidelity to client interests. Over the last century, the bar's codes of conduct
have narrowed the moral discretion that lawyers are expected to
exercise once they have accepted representation.'62 Except in
limited circumstances, such as where a client seeks assistance in

159. See Lane, Happiness?, supra note 156, at 61.
160. See MYERS, supra note 156, at 51-58; Lane, Happiness?, supra note 156, at 61.
161. See Mark J. Osiel, Lawyers as Monopolists, Aristocrats, and Entrepreneurs, 103
HARV. L. REV. 2009, 2047-48 (1990) (book review).
162. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39,
40 n.3 (1989). For general critiques of this trend, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
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criminal or fraudulent conduct, lawyers are to maintain clients'
confidences and to pursue their interests "zealously within the
bounds of the law."" In effect, an attorney's obligation is to
defend, not judge, the client. Under this standard view, good
ethics and good business are in happy coincidence.
Yet such efforts to align moral commitments with prudential
interests are not entirely convincing. The assumption underpinning bar ethical codes is that the most effective way to discover
truth and preserve rights is through an adversarial process in
which lawyers have "undivided fidelity to each client's interests
as the client perceives them."' This assumption remains plausible only if all interests have adequate representation and comparable access to information and legal resources. Such conditions seldom prevail in the world that lawyers encounter. Most
practitioners at least occasionally confront circumstances in
which a client's legal objectives cannot readily be justified under
accepted ethical principles. Familiar examples include health,
safety, or financial risks that are inadequately regulated, or
circumstances where important nonclient interests are inadequately represented."
These contexts receive insufficient concern both in the bar's
ethical standards and in its discussions of professionalism. 66
The result is a dispiriting disjuncture between current norms
and traditional aspirations. The idealized vision of lawyers as
independent "sentinels" of justice is out of phase with prevailing
models of successful practice.167

163. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 7-1 (1980). For requirements of confidentiality, see id. DR 4-101; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6 (1995).
164. AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT ch. II cmt. (Roscoe Pound-American
Trial Lawyers Found. 1982), reprinted in STEVEN GILLER & Roy D. SIMON, JR.,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 323, 335 (1989).

165. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 162, at 149-54; SIMON, supra note 112; Rhode,
supra note 162, at 614-15; David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV., 1145, 1155-56 (1993).
166. For discussion of codified standards, see LUBAN, supra note 162, at app. 1;
Rhode, supra note 162, passim; Simon, supra note 162, at 1087-90. For the professionalism debate, see Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism
Crusade, 74 TEL L. REV. 259 (1995). "
167. See Joseph Story, Address Delivered Before Members of the Suffolk Bar (Sept.
4, 1821), excerpted in THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 63, 71 (Perry Miller ed., 1962).
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A final tradeoff, similarly neglected in professionalism debates,
involves the tension between professional autonomy and public
respect. Many lawyers' sense of professional accomplishment is
tied to their view of law as an "honorable" and honored profession.
Concerns about the erosion of popular respect drive the bar's
public education efforts, as well as some particularly ill-conceived
responses to antilawyer sentiments. For example, in 1993, following a tragic mass murder in a San Francisco law office,
California's bar president proposed that jokes deriding attorneys
should be classified as hate speech.1 s He also suggested that
crimes targeting attorneys should receive enhanced punishment,
comparable to penalties for crimes against police officers.'69
Unsurprisingly, these proposals generated their own wave of
antilawyer humor and trivialized the concerns that fueled it.
Although many practitioners resent the level of popular animosity toward the profession, they generally resist efforts to address its sources. They particularly resist seeing any connection
between public respect and public accountability or any tension
between public accountability and professional autonomy.
Rather, the assumption frequently repeated in ethical codes and
professionalism discussions is that the bar's power of self-regulation serves the public interest by helping to "maintain the legal
profession's independence from government domination."7 '
Almost never do bar leaders acknowledge the possibility that
self-interest might occasionally skew lawyers' sense of the public
interest or their understanding of appropriate professional obligations. To the contrary, as a New York Bar's Committee on the
Profession confidently asserted: "While superficially there may
appear to be a tension between professional responsibility and
self-interest, in fact, broadly viewed, there is none."' Such assertions speak volumes about the significance of self-interest

168. See Vicki Torres, Chief of Bar Assn. Asks End to Lawyer-Bashing, L.A. TIMES,
July 6, 1993, at Al (quoting Harvey Saferstein, California Bar Ass'n president).
169. See id. For a discussion of these proposals and the backlash that they generated, see Thomas W. Overton, Lawyers, Light Bulbs, and Dead Snakes: The Lawyer
Joke as Societal Text, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1069, 1073-74 (1995).
170. MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT preamble (1995).

171. Committee on the Profession, supra note 85, at 133 (quoting the July 1987
report of the Association's Committee on the Second Century).
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and the potential for self-deception. If, as Roscoe Pound once put
it, the ABA is "not... the same sort of thing as a retail grocers'
association," then self-regulation brings out more of the similarities than the differences.172 No vocational group, however wellintentioned, can make entirely unbiased assessments of the public interest on issues that place its own status and income directly at risk.
As virtually every expert on professional regulation observes,
the greater an occupation's autonomy, the greater the risk of
tunnel vision. 7 ' Eliot Freidson, one of the nation's leading sociologists of the professions, describes the problem:
[Qince given its special status, the profession quite naturally
forms a perspective of its own, a perspective all the more distorted and narrow by its source in a status answerable to no
one but itself... Consulting professions are not baldly selfinterested unions struggling for their resources at the expense of others and of the public interest. Rather, they are
well-meaning groups which are protected from the public by
their organized autonomy and at the same time protected
from their own honest self-scrutiny by their sanctimonious
myths of the inherently superior qualities of themselves as
professionals .... 174

Nowhere is the problem more apparent than in bar governance processes. Standards of professional conduct have been
drafted, adopted, and enforced by bodies composed almost entirely of attorneys.'75 Nonlawyers have had no representation
in the adoption process by courts and bar associations and have
obtained only token representation on disciplinary enforcement
bodies.'76 Few of these lay members had the backgrounds, resources, or ties to consumer organizations that could create a

172. ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 7 (1953).
173. See MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 138 (1981); ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE 105-06 (1970); S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS:
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA, (1987); Jonathan Ris, Professional Regulation:

The Current Controversy, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 109 (1983).
174. ELIOT FREIDsON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE 370 (1970).
175. See Rhode, supra note 71, at 687.
176. See id.
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significant counterweight to professional dominance. 7 '
Given this structure, it is scarcely surprising that studies of
bar regulatory processes uniformly find them seriously inadequate in responding to ordinary consumer grievances. 78 Yet,
although the vast majority of surveyed attorneys concede that
the current disciplinary process is flawed, comparable numbers
reject changes in its structure. 79 The bar's unwillingness to
confront tradeoffs in its regulatory objectives undermines its
professionalism agenda. As long as lawyers resist public accountability, they are unlikely to win public confidence.
If lawyers are seriously committed to fostering professionalism, then they first must develop a clearer sense of what it
means and the tradeoffs it requires. The bar needs a vision beyond the wistful nostalgia and wishful exhortation that dominates current debates.
V. RECASTING THE PROBLEM; RETHINKING THE RESPONSES

At a recent ABA Conference on Teaching and Learning Professionalism, the assembled academics, practitioners, and bar leaders reached partial consensus. 80 There was universal
agreement that law schools should invest far more effort in
teaching professionalism. 8 ' There was universal disagreement
about what professionalism is.8 2 Only at the most abstract level could participants rally around the same vision. Everyone
wanted to encourage "ethical conduct" and "dedication to justice
and the public good."" But they shared no view about what
that would involve in circumstances of any moral complexity.
Nor was there consensus on what tradeoffs the bar should make
177. See id.
178. See COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AMERICAN

BAR ASS*N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY xv-xviii (1992); Rhode, supra

note 71, at 694-96.
179. See McCarthy, supra note 77, at 6 (finding only 20% of surveyed attorneys
agreed that the current discipline system "does a good job of disciplining unethical
attorneys").
180. See PROFESSIONALISM COMM., AMERICAN BAR ASSN, TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM (1996).
181. See id. at 13-25.

182. See id. at 5-10.
183. Id. at 7.
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among sometimes competing interests, such as financial rewards, moral independence, regulatory autonomy, and public
accountability.
Although these disagreements shape most professional debates, the organized bar generally avoids acknowledging as
much. According to the ABA's Commission on Professionalism,
"[wihile one must always be conscious of the variety within the
profession, more unites than separates us."" The organized
bar has its own reasons for insisting on such unity, but it is not
clear that this insistence makes sense. In a study of professionalism sponsored by the American Bar Foundation Research Institute, Robert Nelson and David Trubek notes that an image of
consensus and cohesion is critical to protect the bar's monopoly
and regulatory independence.'8 5 Yet as they also emphasize,
that image is more an aspiration than a description. Today's
profession has become too diverse and specialized, and its bar
associations too weak and divided, to enforce any unifying vision
of professional ideals.'8 6
As a result, the professionalism campaign has remained at a
level of comforting generality, with "vague... invocation[s] of
'shared' values that really aren't shared and a symbolic and nostalgic crusade... which has little to do with everyday working
visions of American lawyers." 8 ' Bar leaders have lurched from
project to project: professionalism essay contests and awards,
voluntary civility codes, and countless public relations efforts.'88 None seem likely to matter much. None focus on structural reforms that could matter in bar ethical standards and
regulatory processes.
In their current form, these standards remain as much part of
the problem as the solution to the bar's professionalism prob-

184. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 51, at 262.
185. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Areas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS / LAWYERS' PRACTICES,
supra note 74, at 177, 195.
186. See id.
187. Nelson & Trubek, supra note 74, at 14.
188. See Jack L. Sammons, The ProfessionalismMovement: The Problems Defined, 7
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoLy 269, 269-71 (1993). Nothing in the history
of such bar public relations efforts suggests that they are an effective strategy for
changing popular perceptions. See Overton, supra note 169, at 1103.

1998]

THE PROFESSIONALISM PROBLEM

317

lems. Their guiding principles, as Freidson has noted, draw too
heavily "from selected fragments of idealized history... [and]
pious exhortations."'8 9 Above all, lawyers' codes reflect lawyers'
concerns. On issues of public significance, the public interest too
seldom prevails.
Any serious response to the dilemmas confronting the American legal profession must begin from different premises. Although this is not the occasion for a full-scale blueprint of that
alternative vision, certain guiding principles bear emphasis.
These involve diversity within the profession, moral responsibilities of lawyers, access to legal services, and public accountability
for professional regulation.
The first of these principles calls for adequate recognition of
the variations among contemporary lawyers. For the American
bar, this is in an era of postmodern professionalism, with identities fractured along lines of personal background, substantive
specialty, and practice setting. As applied to law, the term "profession" has become a kind of folk concept. 9 ' In common usage,
it conveys a unity that is out of step with social realities. The
concerns of a small town Oklahoma divorce lawyer in a solo
practice bear little resemblance to those of an urban federal
prosecutor or an associate specializing in corporate mergers in a
large Wall Street firm. Differences in age, race, gender, ideology,
and family status further complicate the picture.
It is time to reconsider whether an occupation as large and
varied as the American bar is well served by a unified regulatory structure. The profession needs to recognize in form what is
true in fact. Lawyers with diverse backgrounds and practice contexts need different preparation and sources of guidance. Our
current one-size-fits-all model of legal education and professional
regulation badly needs revision.
Changes in accreditation standards for law schools could permit more varied curricula and degrees. Some institutions could
provide advanced interdisciplinary instruction for students and
practitioners in particular substantive areas, while others could

189. Eliot Freidson, Professionalism as Model and Ideology, in LAWYERS' IDEALS /
LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 74, at 214, 227.

190. See id. at 215.
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offer shorter, less expensive degree programs that would prepare
graduates to practi~e in limited fields. Such abbreviated programs could reduce students' debt burdens, increase the pool of
graduates willing to provide low-cost routine services, and relieve some of the pressure to maximize income at the expense of
other values. If these graduates had more options to obtain additional courses or degrees later in their careers, then the risks of
early specialization would be less substantial.
Greater recognition of diversity within the profession also argues for more diverse regulatory structures. Prevailing ABA-approved ethical codes are not an adequate source of moral guidance. In a profession that is sharply divided and scarcely disinterested, such codes end up reflecting too high a level of abstraction and too low a common denominator of conduct. In order to
achieve consensus, bar standards must satisfy a group that is
varied in social background, practice settings, and ideological
views, but largely united in its desire to minimize members'
risks of disciplinary sanctions or civil liability. 9 ' The result is
an unsatisfying mix of vague directives, moral exhortation, and
minimal prohibitions.19 2
A true commitment to professionalism will require supplementing codes with more specific and more demanding standards. That
process is already underway, but much could be done to expand
its reach. Some specialized bar associations have drafted practicespecific rules, such as the Standardsof Conduct by the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and the Guidelinesto Tax Practice by an ABA Section of Taxation.'3 If specialized associations
certified lawyers who comply with such standards, then the consequence might be a more efficient market in reputation and a
more effective reward structure for ethical performance.'" So
191. See Rhode, supra note 162, at 616 & n.97; Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism
as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics Code, in LAWYERS' IDEALS
LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 74, at 95, 132-35.
192. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(a) (1995) (requiring "reasonable" fees); id. Rule 6.1 ("A lawyer should aspire to render at least
(50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year."); id. Rule 1.2(d) (prohibiting

assistance in criminal or fraudulent conduct).
193. BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers 1992), reprinted in 9 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1 (1992); GUIDELINES TO TAX PRACTICE (1978), reprinted in 31 TAX. LAW. 551 (1978).
194. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooper-
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too, if courts, bar disciplinary committees, and workplace policies reinforced heightened ethical requirements, then the result
could be improved practice norms.
More public and private sector employers could assist this
process by adopting policies, oversight structures, and internal
training programs designed to encourage ethical conduct. Courts
or legislatures could also require such initiatives for all employers over a certain size or for those whose lawyers have engaged
in sanctionable misconduct. For example, trial judges, bar committees, or administrative agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission could require that attorneys who violate
practice standards submit a regulatory plan to prevent subsequent misconduct by themselves or their colleagues.
Adequate recognition of diversity within the profession will
also require more adequate equal opportunity initiatives. Again,
the bar does not lack for models. Many employers and professional associations have developed effective policies concerning
part-time schedules, mentoring, diversity training, and extended
family leave.' 5 But many employers have not, and some tolerate a wide gap between formal policies and workplace practices. "6 According to ABA survey data, less than ten percent of
lawyers in private practice work reduced hours, and sixty percent-believe that taking part-time status would limit their opportunities for advancement.'9 7
Workplace cultures that only grudgingly accommodate
women's family obligations are usually even less tolerant of
men's. "I have a family. I didn't get time off... Why should
you?" is a common attitude.' Part of the answer, of course, is
that penalizing men who demand such time penalizes women
and families as well. It encourages unequal division of responsi-

ation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 561-62
(1994); Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?,
in LAWYERS' IDEALS I LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 74, at 230, 243-48.
195. See Deborah L. Rhode, Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FoRDHAM L. REV.
39, 70 (1994).
196. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF THE PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON GENDER BIAS
(1992), reprinted in 45 STAN. L. REv. 2153, 2166 (1993).
197. See YOUNG LAWYERS DIV., supra note 105, at 25-27.
198. Epstein et al., supra note 100, at 409.
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bilities in the home, which yields unequal opportunities outside
it. As long as work/family conflicts appear to be primarily
"women's issues," they are unlikely to attract sufficient concern
in decision-making structures controlled largely by men.
Inattention to diversity and quality-of-life issues not only undermines the profession's commitment to equal opportunity, but
also compromises other values. The inadequacy of family policies and the persistence of gender, racial, and sexual orientation bias are leading causes of job dissatisfaction, stress, depression, and attrition.1 99 These take a toll on client representation as well as on employers' bottom lines. Lawyers have
long been leaders in the national struggle for equal opportunity. The challenge remaining is for them to confront the barriers
in their own profession.
A second guiding principle calls for lawyers to accept personal moral responsibility for the consequences of their professional acts. To satisfy this principle, lawyers' conduct needs consistent, disinterested, and generalizable foundations. The rationale
for professional actions cannot depend on retreats into roles
that deny the need for reflection at precisely the moment when
reflection is most needed.
In effect, this principle demands more practical content for
traditional ideals. If lawyers see themselves as officers of justice,
then they must accept greater obligations to pursue it. No longer
should ethical analysis be shortcircuited through appeals to some
idealized vision of the adversary process. Rather, attorneys need
to consider the consequences of their advocacy in a realistic social
context where not all interests are adequately represented.

199. See AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY
BAR ASSN, LOS ANGELES COUNTY BAR ASS'N REPORT ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION BIAS
(1994), reprinted in 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 295, 297-302 (1995); BREAKING POINT, supra note 100, at 1-12; CAREER SATISFACTION, supra note 78, at 10;
HARVARD WOMEN'S LAW ASS'N, supra note 100, passim; Committee on Lesbians &
Gay Men in the Legal Profession, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Report
on the Experience of Lesbians and Gay Men in the Legal Profession, 48 RECORD 843,
855 (1993); Epstein et al., supra note 100, at 387-88, 390-403; Special Comm. on
Lesbians & Gay Men in the Legal Profession, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New
York, Report of Findings from the Survey on Barriers and Opportunities Related to
Sexual Orientation, 51 RECORD 130, 133-38 (1996); Sells, supra note 96, at 3A; Women in the Law Survey, supra note 100, at 84-85.
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Similar problems plague the legislative process, and they
should be equally relevant to ethical decision making. Some conduct that is inconsistent with social interests remains legal either because prohibitions are too difficult or costly to enforce, or
because policymakers lack sufficient information or independence from special interests. That clients have a legal right to
pursue a certain objective does not mean that they have a moral
right to do so, or that justice necessarily will be served by their
zealous representation. Rather, one of a lawyer's most socially
valued functions is to counsel clients about the full range of ethical considerations that bear on particular decisions and to withrun counter to the lawyer's own
hold assistance in matters that
200
sense of social responsibility.
This reformulation of role does not contemplate that attorneys
must endorse all aspects of their clients' conduct. Under conventional ethical theories, moral responsibility depends on a range
of factors, including an individual's degree of information, involvement, and capacity to affect action, as well as the action's
likely consequences and connections to broader moral principles. 0 1 So, for example, the importance of protecting free
speech for unpopular causes or fair trials for criminal defendants may justify zealous representation despite other possible
costs. But the rationale for advocacy in such cases should not
serve as some all-purpose paradigm. Nor should the general
importance of encouraging client trust and protecting confidentiality trump all competing values.
Lawyers will, of course, differ over how to weigh the values at
issue. And in some contexts, the need for a categorical rule
should restrict individual attorneys' discretion. But any such
rules must satisfy commonly accepted ethical principles, not just
the restricted client-centered concerns that dominate bar ethical
codes.
A third guiding principle calls for equitable access to legal
services. One of the public's central concerns about lawyers and

200. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1995); Robert W.
Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 258 (1990);
Anthony T. Kronman, The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 DICK. L. REv. 489, 498 (1996).
201. See Rhode, supra note 162, at 644.
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legal processes involves their expense and inaccessibility. 2 ' To
address those concerns, more efforts should focus on reducing
the need for legal assistance, lowering the costs of services available, and expanding the reach of subsidized alternatives.
The first cluster of strategies should emphasize law reforms
that would enable individuals to handle more of their own problems. Procedural simplification, plain English statutes, and nofault compensation systems are obvious examples."'3
A second set of initiatives should focus on decreasing the costs
of legal assistance. A primary target of reform should be rules
forbidding nonlawyers from performing routine legal services.
Alternative frameworks are readily available. In many nations,
nonlawyers with legal training provide routine services that only
attorneys may offer in this country.2 No evidence suggests
that these lower-priced services have been inadequate.0 5 Reform along these lines would produce a more differentiated
credentialing process, and routine assistance could become more
readily available through certified paralegals working in formprocessing services, citizens' advice bureaus, government agencies, and court clerks' offices.20 ' Further reductions in costs
may be possible through carefully tailored mediation and alternative dispute resolution programs.0 7

202. See Samborn, supra note 5, at 22.
203. See Roger C. Cramtn, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 562-63 (1994).

204. See Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of Legal Professions: An Exploratory Essay, 1985 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 29.

205. See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Perspective:Alternative Approaches to
Nonlawyer Practice, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 701, 709-10 (1996).

206. See Cramton, supra note 203, at 573-74; Rhode, supra note 205, at 713-14;
Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHcs 209, 229-33 (1990).
207. See Cramton, supra note 203, at 563-64. Not all ADR and mediation programs
provide cost savings but they may have other virtues. See Deborah R. Hensler, Puzzling Over ADR: Drawing Meaning from the RAND Report, DISP. RESOL., Summer

1997, at 8, 9 (noting that ADR systems surveyed were not representative of good
mediation programs because the providers were untrained and the sessions too short
and too narrowly focused); James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation and
Early Neutral Evaluation Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: A Summary, DISP.

RESOL., Summer 1997, at 4, 6 (finding no reduction in cost or delay from surveyed
federal ADR programs).
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More efforts also should center on increasing the availability
of subsidized services. Expanded pro bono programs are a modest step in the right direction. Organizations employing lawyers
need to place higher value on public service contributions in
practice, not just in principle, and to reward such work in promotion and compensation decisions.
More fundamental changes are also necessary in government
support for legal aid. After recent cutbacks in federal funding,
the vast majority of poor individuals lack any realistic access to
lawyers.2 8 Low and moderate income consumers also remain
priced out of the market for many legal matters.0 9 Other countries provide far more adequate government-subsidized assistance. These nations typically rely on some combination of insurance coverage and progressive subsidies for basic legal
needs. 2 0 A comparable system in this country might enjoy
broader public support and prove less vulnerable to restrictions
than current programs serving only the poor.
To make these changes plausible, a final guiding principle
demands public accountability for professional regulation. Acting
under their inherent power to regulate the practice of law,
courts have overvalued professional autonomy and have delegated too much of their own oversight responsibility to the organized bar.' The result has been a governance structure that
inadequately responds to public concerns, particularly those concerning the cost and accessibility of legal services, the protection
of nonclient interests, and the sanctions for unethical conduct. 212 All too often, bar ethical codes and enforcement committees have resolved conflicts between professional and societal
objectives in favor of those doing the resolving.

208. See David Barringer, Downsized Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1996, at 60;
MacLachlan, supra note 68, at Al; sources cited infra note 209.
209. See ACCESS TO JUSTICE WORKING GROUP, STATE BAR OF CAL., AND JUSTICE
FOR ALL: FULFILLING THE PROIM:ISE OF ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 17-19
(1996); ALBERT H. CANTRIL, AMERICAN BAR ASsN, AGENDA FOR ACCESS: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CIVIL JUSTICE 4, 26-27 (1996); Pearce, supra note 3, at 1249.
210. See Cramton, supra note 203, at 589-92; Jim Towry, Addressing the Needs of
the Poor, CAL. B.J., Aug. 1996, at 4 (comparing European and American funding patterns for poverty-related legal services).
211. See Rhode, supra note 71, at 694-96.
212. See id.; supra notes 173-79, 189, 191-92, 217-21 and accompanying text.
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To be sure, lawyers need some measure of independence from
governmental control if they are to check governmental abuses.
But America now strikes the wrong balance between autonomy
and accountability. Other countries with independent legal professions have regulatory structures that permit more responsiveness to consumer concerns."' 3 Some state legislators also have
considered disciplinary structures that would remain independent of both the government and the organized bar.214 One proposed California statute would have established a board under
state supreme court auspices with members appointed by multiple legislative, executive, and bar leaders representing diverse
constituencies."'
How authority should be divided among various regulatory
bodies is, of course, a complicated question and one that receives
far too little serious attention from the organized bar.216 The
structure of professional oversight has grown increasingly chaotic, partly because inadequacies in bar ethical standards and enforcement have encouraged intervention by other decision makers." 7 The resulting patchwork of disciplinary, malpractice,
and agency regulations, however, leaves significant gaps and
inconsistencies. A profession truly committed to professionalism
cannot afford these inadequacies. Nor can lawyers assume, in
the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, that self governance always serves societal interests. Under current disciplinary systems, about ninety percent of complaints are never investigated.218 Less than two percent result in any public sanctions. 9 At least part of the reason for these patterns is that

213. For a discussion of British initiatives designed to promote greater competition
and access to services, see Lord Mackay's Legacy, ECONOMIST, July 18, 1992, at 15,
15-17.
214. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 67, at 860-61.
215. See id. (referring to an early version of S.B. 1543, 1985-86 Reg. Sess., 1986
Cal. Stat. 3909).
216. For the first comprehensive treatment, see David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992). For subsequent views, see Symposium, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1
(1996).
217. See Wilkins, supra note 216, at 807-08.
218. See RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 67, at 859.
219. See id.
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most disciplinary authorities do not have the resources or
jurisdiction to pursue common client grievances, such as "mere"
negligence and fee disputes.o Nor have judicial or bar decision makers proved willing to impose serious sanctions except
in the most egregious cases.22 '
The failures of bar-controlled oversight structures have
prompted an expanded range of overlapping, at times conflicting, bodies of regulation. Civil liability suits, as well as legislative and administrative agency regulations, supplement or
supplant bar standards in a widening array of contextsY2
The task now is to build a coherent structure from these increasingly disjointed patterns and to ensure that it accommodates interests in public accountability as well as professional
autonomy.
The term "profession" has its origins in the Latin root "to
profess" and in the European tradition of requiring members to
declare their commitment to shared ideals. The American bar
has maintained the form but lost the substance of that tradition. Entering lawyers may still profess to serve justice as
officers of the court, but that declaration has little moral content in contemporary practice. Efforts to revive a richer sense
of professionalism have foundered on the lack of consensus
about what those ideals should require and how to reconcile
them with more worldly interests.
In this context, it makes sense to view professionalism not
as a fixed ideal, but rather as an ongoing struggle. The problems facing lawyers involve not just public image, but also
personal identity. The challenge is to work toward understandings of professional responsibility that are both more and less
demanding. They must ask more than current codes and enforcement structures, but they must offer a vision that also
seems plausible in practice. Recent debates on professionalism
have suffered from overly ambitious aspirations and overly
limited initiatives.
220. See HALT (AMERICANS FOR LEGAL REFORM), ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE: NATIONAL
SURVEY AND REPORT 17-22 (1990); Don J. DeBendictus, ABA Adopts Most Discipline
Proposals,A.B.A. J., Apr. 1992, at 28, 28.
221. See HALT, supra note 220, at 17-22; RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 67, at 863-75.
222. See Wilkins, supra note 216, at 805-09.
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That mismatch is by no means inevitable. On matters of
public interest not involving their own regulation, lawyers have
been crucial in bridging the distance between ideals and institutions. By turning similar energies inward, the bar may
give more substantial content to its highest traditions.

